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We consider two mechanisms to procure differentiated goods: a sealed-bid buyer-determined auction and adynamic-bid price-based auction with bidding credits. The sealed-bid buyer-determined auction is analo-
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a price and the inherent quality of his good. Then the buyer selects the seller who offers the greatest difference
in quality and price. In the dynamic-bid price-based auction with bidding credits, the buyer assigns a bidding
credit to each seller conditional upon the quality of the seller’s good. Then the sellers compete in an English
auction, with the winner receiving the auction price and his bidding credit. Game-theoretic models predict the
sealed-bid buyer-determined auction is socially efficient but the dynamic-bid price-based auction with bidding
credits is not. The optimal bidding credit assignment undercompensates for quality advantages, creating a mar-
ket distortion in which the buyer captures surplus at the expense of the seller’s profit and social efficiency. In our
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1. Introduction
Large enterprises procure many goods for which the
alternatives differ in quality. Often in such situations,
the sellers find it neither feasible nor profitable to
modify the nonprice attributes of their goods. Some
examples are the procurement of office furniture,
hotel stays, and contract software programming. Tra-
ditionally, such goods are bought via a “request for
quote” procedure.
As part of their e-procurement agendas, many
enterprises search for mechanisms that will provide
better combinations of quality and price than the stan-
dard “request for quote” mechanism. Most of these
searches lead to some form of an English auction.1
The promise to deliver the lowest-cost seller through
cut-throat price competition entices the enterprise.
Unfortunately, when goods vary in quality, the use
1 Within the e-procurement community, the English auction is often
called the reverse auction.
of an English auction can undermine the enterprise’s
efforts: often the lowest cost seller doesn’t provide the
best combination of price and quality. To address this
issue, we introduce a stage prior to the English auc-
tion in which the buyer can assign bidding credits to
sellers. Our primary focus in this study is whether
an enterprise’s interests are better served by our pro-
posed dynamic-bid price-based auction with bidding
credits (henceforth “dynamic PBA with credits”) or
the traditional “request for quote” auction—which we
refer to as the sealed-bid buyer-determined auction
without bidding credits (henceforth “sealed BDA”).2
The sealed BDA is our baseline for standard indus-
try procurement practice, whereas the dynamic PBA
with credits is an alternative we speculate is easy to
implement, has good theoretical properties, and has a
dominant strategy sellers are likely to adopt.
2 This research originated from an evaluation of online auction for-
mats for IBM’s procurement division.
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The sealed BDA starts with the buyer providing
her evaluation criteria for the nonprice attributes, i.e.,
how she measures quality, to potential sellers. The
buyer provides the evaluation criteria, even though
the nonprice attributes of a good are fixed. This way
a seller knows the quality level assigned to his good.3
Next, each seller sets a price and provides the fixed
description of his product. The buyer then selects the
seller who offers the largest margin between quality
and price. The winning seller receives his submitted
price.
In our formulation of the sealed BDA as a game of
incomplete information, we define a seller’s type as
his realized surplus (quality minus cost) and a seller’s
bid as a surplus offer (quality minus price). We also
assume that the procurer knows the quality of each
seller but not his costs, that each seller only knows his
own cost and quality, and that each seller assumes the
other sellers’ qualities and costs are identically and
independently distributed.
Under this formulation, the sealed BDA is equiva-
lent to a first-price sealed-bid auction for selling an
object to potential buyers with independent private
values.4 A seller’s realized surplus in a sealed BDA
is equivalent to a buyer’s private value in a standard
first-price sealed-bid auction; both are the potential
gains from exchange that the auction participant pro-
vides. A surplus offer in a sealed BDA is equivalent to
a buyer’s bid in a first-price sealed-bid auction; both
are an offer of utility by the bidder to the auction-
eer. We exploit this equivalence to derive a symmetric
Nash equilibrium for the sealed BDA. The symmetric
equilibrium strategy is a surplus offer function that is
an increasing function of realized surplus, ensuring
the seller with the highest realized surplus wins and
the auction is socially efficient.5
3 Hence, we are not considering the buyer making a strategic
choice of evaluation functions for the auction as in studies such
as Dasgupta and Spulber (1990) and Che (1993). Furthermore, we
do not address the issue of whether a buyer should reveal private
information about this demand as in studies such as Tan (1996) and
Rezende (2009).
4 First analyzed in a noncooperative equilibrium framework by
Vickrey (1961).
5 This change of variable approach has been successfully and inde-
pendently used in two recent papers on procurement with design
tournaments: Fullerton et al. (2002) and Che and Gale (2003). In
In the dynamic PBA with credits, as in the sealed
BDA, the buyer provides the evaluation criteria to the
sellers, who in turn provide their product descrip-
tions. Observing the quality of each good, the buyer
assigns a bidding credit to the seller of each good.
Then the sellers, each with bidding credit in hand,
compete in an English auction. In the auction, sell-
ers offer successively lower prices until the winning
seller submits a price that no other seller is willing to
improve upon. The winning seller receives the auc-
tion price and his bidding credit.
We derive the equilibrium strategies of the dynamic
PBA with credits by using a backward induction
approach. For any bidding credit assignment, a seller’s
optimal strategy is to exit the auction when the price
falls below his cost less his bidding credit. Anticipat-
ing sellers following this strategy, the buyer’s optimal
bidding credit rule is discriminatory. In the case of
two sellers, although the buyer assigns a larger credit
to the seller of the higher-quality good, the credit is
smaller than his quality advantage. The buyer’s opti-
mal rule is reminiscent of the discriminatory policies
of an optimal auction when sellers have asymmetric
cost distributions.6 In these optimal auctions and the
dynamic PBA with credits, the optimal discriminatory
policies promote competitive pressure by subsidizing
the disadvantaged sellers, and enrich the buyer at the
expense of sellers’ profits and social efficiency.
Our experimental results differ from the game-
theoretic predictions. In our experiment, the dynamic
PBA with credits is more socially efficient, providing
a better average outcome to both the seller and buyer
than the sealed BDA provides. In the sealed BDA ses-
sions, many subjects’ choices do not correspond to
the Nash equilibrium strategy. The Nash equilibrium
strategy for our sealed BDA is nonlinear, and other
studies, such as Chen and Plott (1998), Georee and
Offerman (2002), Pezanis-Christou (2002), and Guth
et al. (2005), demonstrate that subjects tend not to play
nonlinear Nash equilibrium strategies.
both of the papers, sellers participate in a design contest to deter-
mine quality and then the enterprise uses and auction to pur-
chase the innovation. Englebrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007) also use
this approach for the same setting as ours.
6 Myerson (1981), McAfee and McMillan (1989), and Bulow and
Roberts (1989) derive the optimal auction for procurement when
sellers have asymmetric costs.
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Our sessions of dynamic PBA with credits are sim-
ilar to the sessions of Cornes and Schotter (1999)
that consider sealed-bid procurement auctions using
price preferences to promote minority representation.
Cornes and Schotter (1999) use fixed levels of the
price preference as their treatment variable. They find
that the level of minority representation increases
with the level of the price preference, but procure-
ment costs are minimized at some interior level of
the price preference. In our experiment, we allow the
buyer to choose the bidding credits. Buyers select dis-
criminatory bidding credits, but not as discriminatory
as advocated by the optimal bidding credit rule. The
combination of the sellers’ nonequilibrium behavior
in the sealed BDA and the buyer’s overly generous
bidding credits in the dynamic PBA with credits gives
rise to the outcome of the dynamic PBA with credits
Pareto dominating the outcome of the sealed BDA.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007) present a theo-
retical and experimental study closely related to this
one. They also consider procurement for differenti-
ated goods with exogenous quality, and they compare
buyer-determined and price-based auctions. Their the-
oretical analysis shows that, under Nash equilibrium,
with a small number of sellers and little correlation
between cost and quality, the price-based auction pro-
vides more benefit to the procurement organization
than the sealed BDA does. This is a result that applies
to our setting and shows that even if a buyer assigns
zero bidding credits in the dynamic PBA with credits,
he should do better than in the sealed BDA. Empir-
ically, Engelbrecht-Wiggns et al. (2007) develop an
ingenious experiment in which quality and cost are
positively correlated in such a way that equilibrium
bid functions are linear. As a result, their sealed BDA
auction is slightly more efficient than ours, but surpris-
ingly not by much. In their first-price sealed-bid auc-
tion, they observe overaggressive and heterogeneous
bidding that is typical in this type of auction. In con-
trast, we see in our sessions of dynamic PBA with
credits that sellers bid very closely to the dominant
strategy.
Haruvy and Katok (2008) adopt the Engelbrecht-
Wiggans et al. (2007) setting to compare the perfor-
mance of the sealed BDA versus the dynamic-bid
buyer-determined auction (henceforth “dynamic BDA”).
This study is significant because the dynamic BDA
Table 1 Experimental Treatments Used in This Study
and Related Studies
Price based Bidding credits Buyer determined




Sealed bid Engelbrecht- Haruvy and Katok




is the most common auction form used in online
procurement auctions. Their rather surprising result is
that the sealed BDA soundly outperforms the dynamic
BDA in their experiment. This result, combined with
the results presented in the current paper—namely,
that the dynamic PBA with credits results in a bet-
ter outcome than the sealed BDA for both buyers
and sellers—demonstrates strong potential for the
dynamic PBA with credits as a powerful procure-
ment tool.
Table 1 organizes these related studies. The rows cor-
respond to whether the auction is dynamic or sealed
bid. The columns correspond to whether the auction
winner is determinedwith no consideration for quality
difference (price based), full consideration of quality
differences (buyer determined), or some partial con-
sideration for quality differences (bidding credits).
2. Game-TheoreticModels and
Predictions
In our analysis and experiment, we consider the case
of two sellers and a buyer. Levels of cost and quality
characterize a seller. Seller i’s cost to produce a unit
is a random variable, denoted ci, which is uniformly
distributed on the interval [cL cH ]. A seller incurs this
cost only when he makes a sale. The quality of seller i’s
good is a random variable, denoted vi, which is uni-
formly distributed on the interval [vLvH ]. You can
think of this quality as the buyer’s maximum will-
ingness to pay for the good. The cost and the qual-
ity of each seller’s good are independent random vari-
ables. We ensure that the quality of a seller’s good
always exceeds its cost by assuming vL ≥ cH . At the
time of the auction, each seller knows his quality and
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cost, but only the distributions of the quality and cost
of the other seller’s good. Also, the buyer knows the
quality of each seller’s good but only the distribu-
tion of his costs. This information structure is common
knowledge.
Two of our assumptions merit additional comments.
First, consider the assumption that both the buyer and
seller observe the quality of the seller. In our study,
quality differences between sellers are the differences
in the buyer’s willingness to pay for each seller’s
good. The dubious aspect of this assumption is that the
seller observes private information that is held by the
buyer. Whether the seller knows this information has
no impact in the dynamic PBA with credits, because
a seller’s behavior does not depend upon his qual-
ity. This assumption does remove influential uncer-
tainty from the sealed BDA, but this should lead to a
more positive assessment of the sealed BDA than if this
uncertainty was incorporated. The second assumption
is the independence of a seller’s quality and cost. In
some procurement situations, quality differences are
likely idiosyncratic and uncorrelated with cost. It is
likely in other applications of our results that qual-
ity and cost will be correlated. Our theoretical analysis
is conceptually easy to extend to incorporate correla-
tion, and we describe how this is done at the appropri-
ate point. We do leave open the important question of
how the correlation between quality and cost impacts
behavior.
2.1. Sealed-Bid Buyer-Determined Auction
In this mechanism, potential sellers simultaneously
submit prices. Seller i’s submitted price is denoted pi.
Seller i wins the auction if vi − pi is the maximum of
{v1 − p1v2 − p2} and receives the price pi. In the case of
a tie, a seller is selected at random from the set of win-
ning sellers. The winning seller i’s profit is pi − ci, the
other seller’s profit is zero, and the buyer’s achieved
surplus is = vi − pi.
Although seller i’s type is the pair (vi ci	, the rele-
vant economic information is simply the difference of
the two variables. The potential gains from exchange
seller i provides is si = vi − ci. We call si seller i’s
“realized surplus.” The random variable si has a distri-
bution function, denoted F ( ), which is the convolution
of vi and−ci.7 Instead of explicitly considering the sub-
mitted price, we consider seller i’s “surplus offer,” oi =
vi − pi. Under this formulation, the seller who offers
the buyer the largest surplus offer wins the sealed BDA
auction.
With this change of variables, the sealed BDA has
the same formulation as a first-price sealed-bid auction
used to sell a single object to buyers with private val-
ues. In such a setting, each buyer’s value is her realized
surplus, or the potential gains from exchange she pro-
vides (assuming the seller has a cost of zero). When a
buyer makes a bid, she is making a surplus offer to the
seller. And the highest bid is simply the greatest sur-
plus offer. The equivalence of the sealed BDA, under
the change of variables, and the first-price sealed-bid
auction allows us to derive a symmetric Bayes–Nash
equilibrium using standard arguments such as those
found in McAfee and McMillan (1987).
The symmetric Bayes–Nash equilibrium surplus
offer function for the sealed BDA is





This expression calculates how much of seller i’s real-
ized surplus he offers in equilibrium. From the equilib-
rium surplus offer function and the definition of real-
ized surplus we get the equilibrium bid function





This expression provides the margin demanded by the
seller as a function of cost and quality. For the n-seller
case, the equilibrium strategies are












To better illustrate this derivation, let’s consider the
following example, which uses the parameters of our
experiment. Let ci and vi be independent and uni-
formly distributed with supports of [cL cH = 4080]
7 If quality and cost are correlated, then we would derive the distri-
bution of realized surplus by using the multivariate transformation
theorem.
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and [vLvH = 100130]. Then the distribution of real-
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for 60≤ s ≤ 90
The equilibrium surplus offer and bid functions re-






























The equilibrium surplus offer and bid functions are
depicted in Figure 1. After deriving a sequential Nash
equilibrium of the dynamic PBA with credits, we will
present some of the economic implications of this sym-
metric Nash equilibrium.
2.2. Dynamic-Bid Price-Based Auction with
Bidding Credits
There are two stages in this mechanism. In the first
stage, the buyer assigns a bidding credit to each seller,
conditioning it upon the seller’s quality. Seller i’s bid-
ding credit is denoted bi. In the second stage of the auc-
tion, each seller is told his respective bidding credit,
and then the sellers participate in an English auction.










































The winning seller receives a monetary amount equal
to the auction price and his assigned bidding credit.
We now derive a sequential Nash equilibrium for
this mechanism. Each of a seller’s information sets in
stage two is defined by his bidding credit and the cost
and quality of his good. A seller i’s behavioral strategy
is to set an exit price, ei, for the English auction, i.e.,
the continuation game, at each of his information sets.
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Also, we require that the seller update his belief about
the other seller’s type at each of his information sets
via Bayes’ Rule. This is only a formality because each
seller has a weakly dominant strategy.
Proposition 1. Seller i has a weakly dominant strategy:
e∗i bi ci vi	= ci − bi.
In other words, seller i remains in the auction as long
as the standing price is greater than or equal to the
seller’s cost less his assigned bidding credit.
Proof. Apply one of the standard arguments, such
as that of Krishna (2002, p. 15), that establishes the
weakly dominant strategy in the second-price sealed-
bid or English auctions. Just recalibrate the seller’s zero
payoff price to his cost less his bidding credit. Q.E.D.
Now we derive the buyer’s optimal bidding credit
assignment in stage one. At this point, one could be
tempted to simply appeal to the famous optimal mech-
anism literature result, Myerson (1981), which states
for this example that you give a bidding credit equal
to half the quality advantage in conjunction with a
quality-specific reserve price, and then show that the
dynamic PBA with credits implements this. Unfortu-
nately, we cannot make that appeal because we are
requiring the procurement official to make a purchase.
In terms of the Myerson (1981) formulation of the opti-
mal mechanism problem, the constraint that the sum
of the allocation probabilities assigned to each bid-
der must be less than or equal to one is now a con-
straint that the sum of these probabilities must be one.
This precludes the auctioneer placing his own bid (as a
reserve price) that could win and preempt the award-
ing of the contract. In the absence of reserve prices,
this simple bidding credit is no longer optimal.8 So we
must proceed to directly calculate the optimal bidding
credit rule.
Recall that a buyer’s achieved surplus is the dif-
ference between the quality and the price paid (auc-
tion price plus bidding credit) of the procured object.
8 Intuitively, reserve prices aggressively seek surplus from bidders
with high types, and the Myerson (1981) bidding credit is rela-
tively generous in its promotion of the higher-quality type. In the
absence of a reserve price, the optimal bidding credit is less gen-
erous, because it derives value from creating competitive pressure
for high-quality types.
The buyer’s expected achieved surplus9 for a pair of











Inspection of this payoff function reveals that there are
payoff-equivalent strategy classes for the buyer: two
pairs of bidding credits, (b1 b2	 and (b′1 b
′
2	, yield the
same expected payoff if b1 − b2 = b′1 − b′2. Let K be
the set of payoff-equivalent strategies with the typical
element k, where k ∈ K = b1 b2	 b1 − b2 = k!. From
this point, when we consider a particular k we will be
considering the unique bidding credit pair for which
at least one of the sellers receives a bidding credit of




+Prc1−k>c2v2−Ec1 c1 >c2+k	+k	 (1)
The term Prc1 − k ≤ c2 is the probability that seller 1
wins the auction. This corresponds to the probability of
event A = c1 − k ≤ c2!. Figure 2 shows the two shapes
this event can take in the support of c1 c2	.
With a rectangular distribution on the support, the












9 If quality and cost were correlated, we would express the expecta-
tion of each cost term also to be conditional upon the corresponding
quality.
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Figure 2 Event Space of Seller 1 Winning the Auction
A














Start with the case k ≥ 0. When seller 1 wins
the auction the expected auction price is Ec2  c2 ≥
c1−k k ≥ 0	. To calculate this expectation, we need the
probability density function for the auction price. The
cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the auction
price is
Gy	 ≡ Prc2 ≤ y  c2 ≥ c1 − k!	
= Prc2 ≤ y!∩ c2 ≥ c1 − k!	
Prc2 ≥ c1 − k!	
 (3)
Recall A = c1 − k ≤ c2!, and let B = c2 ≤ y!. Figure 3
shows the relevant events in the support of c1 c2	 for










if cH −k≤y≤cH 
(4)
Figure 3 Two Possible Configurations of the Events That Seller 1














When cL ≤ y ≤ cH – k When cH – k ≤ y ≤ cH
A∩B




y − cL	2k+ y − cL	
2cH − cL	2 − cH − cL − k	2
if cL ≤ y ≤ cH − k
2y − cL	cH − cL	− cH − cL − k	2
2cH − cL	2 − cH − cL − k	2
if cH − k ≤ y ≤ cH 










if cH −k≤y≤cH 
The expected value of c2 conditional upon k and seller








2y2 + 2ky − 2cLy	dy +
∫ cH
cH−k 2cH − cL	y dy











The first term in this expression is the expectation of
the first-order statistic of the draw of two costs, and the
second term is the deviation from this expectation as k
changes.
To better see how these results relate to our exper-
iment, we include our experiment parameters and
see that









One consistency check on this expression is to set k = 0,
i.e., the special case of a simple English auction. When
k = 0, the expected value of the auction price condi-
tional upon seller 1 winning is the expected value of
the maximum cost statistic, or 6623 . A second consis-
tency check is to set k = 40 and guarantee that seller 1
wins the auction. Here the expected value of y is 60,
the unconditional expectation of seller 2’s cost.
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Figure 4 Union of the Set of Events in Which Seller 2 Wins the
Auction and Seller 1’s Cost Is Less Than the Value of y









Now we calculate the expected price conditional
upon seller 2 winning the auction, i.e., Ec1  c1−k ≥ c2
k ≥ 0	. In this instance,
Prc1 − k ≥ c2!	=
cH − cL + k	2
2cH − cL	2
and




0 if y ≤ cL + k
y − cL − k	2
2cH − cL	2
if cL + k ≤ y ≤ cH 
One can verify these probabilities with Figure 4.
The cumulative distribution function of the auction




0 if y ≤ cL + k
y − cL − k	2
cH − cL − k	2
if cL + k ≤ y ≤ cH 
This is the CDF of the maximum statistic for two inde-
pendent draws from a uniform distribution on the
interval [cL + k cH ], permitting us to state
Ec1  c1 − k ≥ c2 k ≥ 0	= 23cH + 13cL + 13k (6)
After substituting (2), (5), and (6) into (1) and simpli-






































Let’s consider the case where k < 0. The symme-
try of the probability and conditional expectation cal-
culations allows us to immediately state the expected





































Without loss of generality, assume seller 1 is the
seller with the higher-quality good. The following
proposition indicates that it is never in the buyer’s
interest to give a larger bidding credit to the lower-
quality seller, i.e., choose k < 0.

















































is strictly positive because a negative k reduces the
probability of seller 1 winning below one-half. Also,
the term











is strictly positive. Finally, the term
−
[




kcH − cL	2 + k2cH − cL − k	
6cH − cL	2 − 3cH − cL − k	2
is also strictly positive. Therefore,
E0	−Ek  k > 0	 > 0 Q.E.D.
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With this proposition, we examine the case of k ≥ 0
for the optimal bidding credit assignment k∗. The first-












∗ − 3cH − cL	− v1 − v2	
4
≤ 0
The first-order condition is a quadratic. Of the two
roots, only the negative one satisfies the second-order
conditions for the maximum. The negative root and




−√3cH −cL	+v1−v2	2−8cH −cL	v1−v2	 )
Proposition 3. The optimal bidding credit assignment





⇒ 9cH −cL	2−18cH −cL	v1−v2	−9v1−v2	2
<9cH −cL	2−2cH −cL	v1−v2	+v1−v2	2
⇒ −16cH −cL	v1−v2	−10v1−v2	2 <0 Q.E.D.
According to Proposition 3, the buyer’s best strategy
in the dynamic PBA with credits is to use a discrim-
inatory rule that assigns a bidding credit to the high-
quality seller that is less than his quality advantage.
The impact of this rule bolsters the low-quality seller’s
competitiveness and leads the high-quality seller to
receive lower expected surplus than in the sealed BDA.
Againwe consider the parameters of our experiment
to form an example: Two sellers independently and
uniformly draw costs from the interval [40, 80] and
qualities from the interval [100, 130]. After the buyer
observes each seller’s quality, she assigns to the higher-
quality seller the bidding credit
k∗ = 120+ v1 − v2	−
√
40+ v1 − v2	2 + 12800
4

An inefficient outcome occurs when the high-quality
seller’s cost is in the interval [c2 + k∗ c2 + v1 − v2	].
For example, if (v1 c1	 = 12060	 and (v2 c2	 =
11055	, seller 1 has the greatest realized surplus but
seller 2 wins the dynamic PBA with credits. Specifi-
cally, the buyer assigns the optimal bidding credit of
1.58 to seller 1, and seller 2 wins the auction at a price
of 58.42.
2.3. Economic Performance
Using the Nash equilibrium strategies for the sealed
BDA and dynamic PBA with credits, we can generate
theoretical predictions of economic variables such as
efficiency, market price, the average quality and cost
of the procured good, and the buyer’s achieved sur-
plus. Table 2 presents the expected values of various
economic variables for the economic environment of
our experiment. Each of the following statistics is asso-
ciated with one of the columns in Table 2: percentage
of efficient outcomes (or the percentage of auctions that
select the seller with the greatest difference between
quality and cost), average realized social surplus (or the
sum of the buyer’s achieved surplus and the winning
seller’s profit), average winning seller’s quality, average
auction price (for the dynamic PBA with credits, this is
the auction price and bidding credit paid), average win-
ning seller’s cost, average buyer’s surplus (or the winning
seller’s quality less total price paid), and average win-
ing seller’s profit. We obtained all of the expected val-
ues, except percentage of efficient outcomes for the sealed
BDA, by simulating each auction 10 million times.
The predicted outcomes of the two mechanisms dif-
fer for many variables. The sealed BDA always gener-
ates a socially efficient outcome because the symmetric
Nash equilibrium strategy is strictly increasing in real-
ized surplus. In contrast, the dynamic PBAwith credits
selects the inefficient seller over 16% of the time. Also,
the buyer’s discriminatory bidding credit assignments
reduce the average winning seller quality. Of course,
the dynamic PBA with credits more than makes up
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Table 2 Nash Equilibrium Predictions for the Sealed BDA and Dynamic PBA with Credits
% of efficient Avg. winning Avg. auction Avg. winning Avg. buyer Avg. winning Avg. realized
Auction outcomes seller quality price seller cost surplus seller profit social surplus
Sealed BDA 10000 11790 7117 5465 4674 1652 6326
Dynamic PBA with credits 8341 11555 6679 5337 4876 1341 6217
for this lower quality with a reduced price and a bias
toward the lower-cost seller. Also, the dynamic PBA
with credits leads to a gain in buyer welfare and a
reduction in seller profit.
From a theoretical perspective, the dynamic PBA
with credits better serves the buyer’s interest than the
standard sealed BDA. But does human behavior con-
form to the models used to derive our predictions?
Past experimental studies show that human choice
often differs from game-theoretic predictions, and we
will see this occur again in our experiment.
3. Experimental Design
All of our experimental sessions, except one, were con-
ducted via a computer software application at the Uni-
versity of California, San Diego Department of Eco-
nomics EEXCL facility. We conducted the other session
at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research facility. Every
session was either a sealed BDA or dynamic PBA with
credits treatment. All sessions were conducted in the
fall of 2000.
Each subject received a show-up payment of $5 prior
to participating in a session (except for the IBM ses-
sion, for which a $20 payment was given). Before the
decision-making portion of a session, each subject read
a paper copy of the instructions and then had to suc-
cessfully complete a simplewritten test of how the auc-
tion worked and how earnings were calculated. After
the experiment, each subject was privately paid his or
her earnings in U.S. currency.
In a sealed BDA session, all subjects were designated
as sellers. The subjects participated in five practice
periods with no payments, and then 50 additional peri-
ods with cash payments proportional to their exper-
imental earnings. Prior to each period, subjects were
randomly paired to participate in different auctions. At
the start of each period, each subject was informed of
his or her quality and cost. Then, each seller privately
submitted a price, and a winner was determined. Sub-
jects were informed of whether they won the auction,
the winning auction price, and their period earnings. A
complete history of this information was always avail-
able to each subject.
In the sessions of dynamic PBA with credits, two-
thirds of the subjects were randomly assigned as
sellers, and one-third as buyers. After two practice
periods, subjects participated in 12 to 16 periods
in which cash earnings accumulated.10 Before each
period, a collection of trios was formed by randomly
matching two sellers and one buyer. Each trio partic-
ipated in their own auction. At the beginning of an
auction, the buyer was informed of the quality of each
seller’s good, and each seller was informed of the qual-
ity and unit cost of his or her good. Then the buyer had
the opportunity to assign a credit to each of the sellers.
Once these credits were assigned, they were revealed
to the respective sellers.
Next, an iterative English auction commenced with
sellers making opening offers. In subsequent itera-
tions, the seller who did not have the lowest current
offer could either exit the auction or make an offer
lower than the current lowest offer. The seller with the
current lowest offer could either maintain his current
offer or improve it. When one of the sellers exited, the
auction concluded. The current lowest price at the con-
clusion determined the auction price.
The winning seller received the auction price and his
assigned credit less his unit cost. The buyer received
the difference between the quality of winning seller’s
good and the total payment to the winning seller. The
losing seller received zero earnings. Over the course of
a session, subjects could see a complete history of the
information that had been revealed to them. We con-
ducted four sealed BDA sessions with 44 total subjects:
10 A dynamic PBA with credits period lasted significantly longer
than a sealed BDA period, and consequently, we used a 20 experi-
mental dollars to one U.S. dollar exchange rate in the dynamic PBA
with credits sessions and a four-to-one exchange rate in the sealed
BDA sessions.
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Table 3 Number of Subjects and Periods in Each Dynamic
PBA Session
Dynamic PBA
session Total periods Practice periods Sellers Buyers
1 14 2 10 5
2 18 2 6 3
3 16 2 10 5
4 16 2 8 4
two with 12 subjects each and two 10 subjects each.
Each sealed BDA session was completed in less than 90
minutes. We conducted four sessions of dynamic PBA
with credits. The number of participants and periods in
each session is given in Table 3. All sessions of dynamic
PBA with credits were completed in 105 minutes.
4. Results on Empirical Economic
Performance
Under Nash equilibrium play, the sealed BDA is
socially efficient, whereas the dynamic PBA with cred-
its better serves the buyer’s interest at the expense
of efficiency and seller profit. Contrary to these pre-
dictions, in experiments, the dynamic PBA with cred-
its is more efficient and nominally makes both buyer
and seller better off than in the sealed BDA. The
difference between the comparative theoretical and
empirical economic performances mostly results from
play that diverges from the theory in the sealed BDA
experiments.
In Table 4, we provide statistics for various perfor-
mance variables from the sealed BDA and dynamic
PBA with credits sessions. For both the sealed BDA
and dynamic PBA with credits sessions, we provide
the sample mean and standard deviation for each vari-
able. Also, for each variable, we provide the z-statistic
and its p-value for the hypothesis test that the means
are the same under both auction types. A bold-faced p-
value indicates the hypothesis is rejected at a 5% level
of significance.
The dynamic PBA with credits, not the sealed BDA,
provides a more socially optimal outcome in the exper-
iments. In over 84% of the dynamic PBA with credits
auctions, the higher-surplus seller wins and the aver-
age total realized social surplus is 63.25, whereas the
higher-surplus seller wins only 79% of sealed BDA
auctions and the average total realized social surplus
is 61.53. Dividing realized social surplus into its two
components, we see that the average buyer surplus
is about 1.7% greater and the average seller profit is
about 5.2% greater in the dynamic PBA with credits
than in the sealed BDA.11
How buyers and sellers in the dynamic PBA with
credits benefit from the advantage in average social
surplus is found by examining the average realized
qualities, prices, and costs. The sealed BDA generates
a higher quality level than the dynamic PBAwith cred-
its (117.69 versus 116.26), but also an increase in costs
(56.15 versus 53.01). The net effect of these two dif-
ferences is the 1.71 advantage in total social surplus
enjoyed by the dynamic PBA with credits. Also, the
average dynamic PBA with credits price is 2.52 lower
than the sealed BDA price. From the seller’s perspec-
tive, the net effect of the price and cost reductions is a
0.62 increase in profit in the dynamic PBAwith credits.
From the buyer’s perspective, the reduction in quality
is more than offset by the reduction in cost, and results
in a 1.09 increase in buyer surplus in the dynamic PBA
with credits.
The differences between the relative empirical per-
formances and the game-theoretic predictions must
mean at least one of the auctions is performing dif-
ferently than its Nash equilibrium predictions. Table 5
presents the observed and theoretical values of the
reported performance variables and hypothesis tests
that the observed and theoretical values are the same.
The theoretical predictions of the sealed BDA are
rejected at the 5% level of significance for all vari-
ables except avg. winning seller quality. On the other
hand, for the dynamic PBA with credits, the theoreti-
cal prediction is only rejected for a single variable. The
observed buyer surplus is significantly less than pre-
dicted. Clearly the Nash equilibrium predictions fare
worse for the sealed BDA than the dynamic PBA with
credits. Subjects not using Nash equilibrium strate-
gies must be the source of the theoretical prediction’s
failures.
5. Analysis of Individual Behavior
To understand how the equilibrium predictions fail
we must identify how subjects’ behavior is deviat-
ing from the equilibrium strategies. First, we consider
11 However, the improvement in surplus for the buyer and seller in
the dynamic PBA with credits is not significant according to the
z-test.
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Table 4 Empirical Auction Performance: Sealed BDA vs. Dynamic PBA with Credits
% of efficient Avg. realized Avg. winning Avg. auction Avg. winning Avg. buyer Avg. winning
Auction outcomes social surplus seller quality price seller cost surplus seller profit
Sealed BDA 79% 6153 11769 6837 5616 4932 1221
Std. dev. 0407 1267 818 939 1064 986 833
Dynamic PBA with credits 8427% 6325 11626 6585 5301 5041 1283
Std. dev. 064 356 286 306 326 314 289
sealed −dynamic −527% −171 143 252 314 −109 −062
z-stat. −201 −200 237 345 474 −125 −094
p-value 0022 0023 0991 1000 1000 0106 0173
Note. A boldfaced p-value indicates the hypothesis of a difference in means is rejected at a 5% level of significance.
Table 5 Auction Performance: Theoretic Predictions and Empirical Measurements
% of efficient Avg. realized Avg. winning Avg. auction Avg. winning Avg. buyer Avg. winning
Auction outcomes social surplus seller quality price seller cost surplus seller profit
Sealed BDA, n= 1100
Theoretical 100% 6326 11790 7117 5465 4674 1652
Observed 79% 6153 11769 6837 5616 4932 1221
Std. dev. 0407 1267 818 939 1064 986 833
z-stat. −17092 −451 −085 −991 469 869 −1716
p-value 0000 0000 0198 0000 1000 1000 0000
Dynamic PBA with credits, n= 248
Theoretical 8341% 6217 11555 6679 5337 4876 1341
Observed 8427% 6325 11626 6585 5301 5041 1283
Std. dev. 0638 356 286 306 326 314 289
z-stat. 0374 140 129 −140 −061 201 −094
p-value 0646 0919 0902 0081 0270 0978 0173
Note. A boldfaced p-value indicates the hypothesis of a difference in means is rejected at a 5% level of significance.
subject behavior in the sealed BDA experiments. Here
we show that sellers offer too much surplus when
they receive high-surplus types and too little surplus
when they receive low-surplus types. Also, subjects
offer different levels of surplus to the buyer for distinct
quality–cost pairs that provide the same realized sur-
plus. Regression analysis shows that there are two dis-
tinct types of bidders: those who make nonlinear bids
that are correlated with the Nash bids, and those who
submit bids linear in cost and quality. This mixture
model explains why sellers are too “generous” or too
“stingy” depending upon their realized surplus types.
In the dynamic PBA with credits, we see that buyers
are too generous with their bidding credit assignments
and that sellers follow their dominant strategy with
one caveat: the losing sellers on average exit the auc-
tion about three dollars before their zero profit price.
This bias takes away some of the buyer’s surplus in the
dynamic PBA with credits.
5.1. Behavior in the Sealed-Bid
Buyer-Determined Auction
To what extent do subjects’ surplus offers correspond
to the Nash equilibrium surplus offer function? When
we plot surplus offers versus realized surplus in Figure
5 we do not see evidence that subjects follow the Nash
surplus offer function. We do see at low levels of real-
ized surplus that subjects will offer less than Nash
levels of surplus, whereas at middle levels of real-
ized surplus the surplus offers exceed the Nash levels,
and at high levels of realized surplus there is tremen-
dous variation in the level of surplus offers. The scat-
ter plot of surplus offers also has several linear bands.
Each of the bands represents a focal amount of profit
demanded by a seller such as $10, $20, or $30. These
bands could be indicative of subjects who only ask for
a fixed absolute margin independent of their quality.
The presence of these bands and the large variation in
the surplus offers raises a question: Is a subject’s sur-
plus offer determined by the difference in quality and
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cost, or more generally by the absolute values of qual-
ity and costs?
Defining realized surplus as a seller’s type is key to
solving for the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy,
but assuming a subject’s behavior is solely character-
ized by his realized surplus, or the difference in qual-
ity and cost, may be inappropriate. To understand how
subjects condition their choices on the absolute levels
of cost and quality, we consider the difference between
submitted and Nash bids for different quality–cost
pairs. In Figure 6, we present the average difference
between submitted and Nash bids for different ranges
of cost–quality pairs. We start by defining 100 equal-
sized bins that cover the supports of the cost and qual-
ity variables. For each bin, we select all the instances
when a subject drew a cost–quality pair in the range
of the bin. For each of these instances, we calculate the
deviation of the submitted bid from the Nash bid. We
calculate the average of all the deviations in the bin,
and the average is the reported as the height of the bar
of the bin in Figure 6.
The graphs of these averages reveal systematic
patterns. First, for each level of cost, the difference
between the submitted and Nash bids falls as qual-
ity increases. Evidently, subjects do not fully appreci-
ate the competitive advantage associated with higher
quality levels. Second, when costs are high and quality
is low—i.e., there is a low level of realized surplus—
submitted bids are greater than Nash bids. This is
Figure 6 Average Difference Between Actual Bid and Predicted Bid











































Note. The shading of a bar is quality specific.
counter to the Nash equilibrium feature that the low-
est type demands zero profit. Third, for low-cost/high-
quality bins, the bids are below theNash levels. Finally,
if the subjects condition their behavior only on the
level of realized surplus, then we would expect the
average bid deviation to be the same for a constant
level of realized surplus. Bins corresponding to the
same level of realized surplus lie on off-diagonal lines
of the cost–quality range. Inspection of the bar graphs
does not suggest equal bid biases for bins lying on
these off-diagonals. Hence, subjects’ behavior is not
invariant to the absolute levels of cost and quality.
Given the significant variation observed when we
pool subject behavior, we now ask whether subjects’
decisions are noisy or whether there is systematic het-
erogeneity in the subjects’ bidding rules. We proceed
by allowing for two possibilities: a subject’s bids could
either be a linear function of cost and quality or cor-
related with the nonlinear Nash bid function. A linear
bid function for subject i has the following form:
pici vi	= '0 +'1ci +'2vi
where the betas are unknown coefficients. We formu-
late the nonlinear Nash bid model as
pici vi	= (0 +(1p∗ci vi	
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where p∗( ) is the Nash bid function. If a bidder exactly
follows the Nash bidding rule, then (0 = 0 and (1 = 1.
The two models allow us to characterize linear bidders
and bidders who follow nonlinear rules that are close
to the Nash equilibrium strategy. We want to ascer-
tain, for each subject, whether either of these models is
appropriate.
We use the J -test of Davidson andMacKinnon (1981)
to determine the selection from the two nonnested
models. First we imbed the two models into one spec-
ification:
pici vi	 = 1−*	'0 +'1ci +'2vi
+*(0 +(1p∗ci vi	
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate this
model. Then we run two hypothesis tests: * = 0 and
* = 1. There are four possible outcomes to this exer-
cise. First, we could reject both hypotheses, and we
would then select the larger nestingmodel. Second, we
could not reject either hypothesis. This would indicate
that both models are adequate and that the models are
highly colinear. Third, we could reject * = 0 but not
* = 1. In this case, we would select the Nash model.
Finally, we could reject *= 1 but not *= 0. In this case,
we would select the linear bid model. Recall that the
Nash bid function is linear over part of the cost–quality
range, and in this range the two models can corre-
spond. This can confound the identification of which
bidding function a subject follows. Nevertheless, our
results allow us to make a definitive model assignment
for half of the subjects.
We apply the J -test to each subject’s data in the
sealed BDA and find substantial heterogeneity in the
bidding strategies. In Table 6, we report for each sub-
ject themodel selected, the estimated parameters of the
selected model, and the r-squared statistic. For 22 of
the 44 subjects, we are able to select a single model. Six
subjects follow the Nash bidding model, and 16 follow
the linear bidding model. The J -test selects both mod-
els for 10 subjects. For these subjects we report the coef-
ficient estimates for the model with the cost, quality,
and Nash bid parameters. Inspection of the regression
results reveals some classic signs of multicollinearity: a
high R2, insignificant coefficients, and coefficients with
the wrong sign. For these 10 subjects, the two mod-
Table 6 Estimated Bidding Models with J-Test Selection Criteria for
Each Subject
NE
Subject Intercept Cost Quality price R-squared Model selected
1 −410 — — 104 0.85 Nash price
2 −811 — — 108 0.64 Nash price
3 1410 — — 078 0.62 Nash Price
4 910 — — 091 0.54 Nash price
5 1380 — — 079 0.54 Nash price
6 2419 — — 066 0.53 Nash Price
7 529 074 015 — 0.94 Linear cost and bid
8 −169 092 012 — 0.93 Linear cost and bid
9 −225 068 027 — 0.88 Linear cost and bid
10 005 089 010 — 0.85 Linear cost and bid
11 1020 066 019 — 0.82 Linear cost and bid
12 828 068 021 — 0.81 Linear cost and bid
13 954 076 011 — 0.81 Linear cost and bid
14 1244 081 008 — 0.77 Linear cost and bid
15 220 065 026 — 0.75 Linear cost and bid
16 1288 086 002 — 0.67 Linear cost and bid
17 1382 061 022 — 0.65 Linear cost and bid
18 1080 063 018 — 0.64 Linear cost and bid
19 693 061 023 — 0.62 Linear cost and bid
20 1835 091 005 — 0.55 Linear cost and bid
21 1845 067 014 — 0.47 Linear cost and bid
22 3865 059 005 — 0.33 Linear cost and bid
23 −405 040 −006 075 0.93 Both models selected
24 443 −001 −015 112 0.87 Both models selected
25 1230 −120 −071 289 0.86 Both models selected
26 −512 −063 −026 203 0.85 Both models selected
27 168 020 −007 088 0.84 Both models selected
28 319 −148 −060 315 0.83 Both models selected
29 3584 −045 −066 186 0.83 Both models selected
30 1241 −089 −036 212 0.70 Both models selected
31 4041 −031 −045 139 0.60 Both models selected
32 5749 −075 −060 176 0.53 Both models selected
33 −1102 008 001 100 0.82 Neither model selected
34 1539 033 001 054 0.79 Neither model selected
35 −313 041 049 006 0.71 Neither model selected
36 −215 030 −002 077 0.70 Neither model selected
37 −704 019 030 053 0.67 Neither model selected
38 2490 −078 −049 214 0.58 Neither model selected
39 810 −017 −002 104 0.57 Neither model selected
40 3639 023 006 025 0.41 Neither model selected
41 1983 −071 −036 195 0.33 Neither model selected
42 4329 016 003 033 0.26 Neither model selected
43 3700 043 −005 031 0.21 Neither model selected
44 2752 064 048 −063 0.12 Neither model selected
Notes. A boldfaced p-value indicates the hypothesis coefficient is equal to
zero and is rejected at a 5% level of significance; there are 50 observations
for each subject. NE, Nash equilibrium.
els are too similar to differentiate. For the remaining
12 subjects, we reject both the linear and Nash mod-
els in favor of the nested model. Here we report the
regression results for the nested regression and again
observe the signs of multicollinearity.
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The J -test exercise demonstrates there are large con-
tingencies of both nonlinear Nash bidders and lin-
ear bidders. The presence of linear bidders leads to
inefficient auction outcomes; linear bidding rules lead
to low prices for high-quality goods. Consequently,
the buyer’s surplus is significantly higher and the
seller’s profit is significantly lower than under the
Nash equilibrium.
5.2. Behavior in the Dynamic-Bid Price-Based
Auction with Credits
Subject behavior in the dynamic PBA with credits
adheres more closely to the game-theoretic predic-
tions than does behavior in the sealed BDA. Again, a
seller has a weakly dominant strategy in the auction:
exit only when the price falls below cost minus bid-
ding credit. Subjects do follow this prescription with
a caveat. The losing seller exits the auction, on average,
three dollars above his threshold price. The buyer’s
Nash strategy is not as apparent as the seller’s. Most of
the time the buyers do assign nonzero bidding credits,
but their assignments are, on average, too generous.
The combination of sellers exiting the auction slightly
early and the buyer’s assigning overly generous bid-
ding credits leads to greater efficiency and seller profit
than predicted.
How closely do sellers adhere to the dominant strat-
egy? In Figure 7, we provide a histogram of the dif-
ference between the losing seller’s exit price and his
dominant strategy exit price. Most losing sellers exit
slightly above their zero profit prices. Specifically, over
81% of the deviations are between zero and four—the
average price was close to 64. In contrast, only 2.4%
of the losing sellers exit after the zero profit price, and
only three out of 248 auction winners lose money. Sell-
ers clearly understand the dominant strategy and exit
close to, but not below, their zero profit prices. We con-
jecture that the tediousness of the English auction is
responsible for the early exit behavior.12
The buyers’ bidding credit assignments greatly vary
and, on average, are more generous than the optimal
bidding credits. First, approximately 25% of the time
the buyer does not utilize the bidding credits to give
12 This raises a potential issue with the Nash equilibrium analysis: if
the subjects were actually discounting their auction payoffs, then our
open outcry implementation of the auction allows alternative equi-
librium involving jump bidding as discussed in Isaac et al. (2007).


























an advantage to the high-quality seller. Specifically, in
over 18% of the auctions, the buyer assigns the same
bidding credit to both sellers, and in almost 7% of
the auctions, the buyer assigns a larger bidding credit
to the lower quality. In these cases, the buyer is cer-
tainly not using the bidding credits to manage qual-
ity differences. At the other end of the spectrum, in
almost 6% of the auctions the difference in the assigned
bidding credits is equal to the difference in quality.
Here, although the buyer is ensuring the best seller
is selected, he is not capturing any additional surplus
over the Nash equilibrium outcome of the sealed BDA.
In Figure 8, we provide a scatter plot of the differ-
ence in bidding credit versus the difference in quality, a
graph of the optimal bidding credit rule, and a graph of
the OLS trend line. The trend line is above the optimal
assignment line, but the OLS trend also has a low R2
that reflects highly variable buyer behavior. Although
the dynamic PBA with credits has a transparent dom-
inant strategy for sellers, the optimal bidding assign-
ment rule proves elusive to the buyers. However, as
seen in Figure 8, the majority of the time the buyers do
use discriminatory assignments.
The experimental results provide an assessment of
the impact the choice of auction has on the effec-
tiveness of procurement activities. The empirical per-
formance of the sealed BDA leaves opportunities for
other mechanisms to improve upon the status quo. As
our experiment shows, the dynamic PBA with cred-
its produces greater total surplus and better serves the
buyer’s interest, depending upon the buyer’s objective
and rule for assigning bidding credits.
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Figure 8 Differences in Assigned Bidding Credits vs. Differences
in Quality
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In this study we assess two alternative mechanisms
that enterprises may use to procure differentiated
goods. The first alternative is the traditional “request
for quote” method, characterized as a sealed-bid
buyer-determined auction. We show that, under a
symmetric Nash equilibrium, the sealed BDA is an effi-
cient mechanism. The second alternative is a dynamic-
bid price-based auction with the buyers assigning
credits to sellers based upon the differing qualities of
the goods for sale. This mechanism has a Nash equilib-
rium in which a seller has a transparent weakly dom-
inant strategy, and the buyer has an optimal bidding
credit assignment, which undercompensates the high-
quality seller for his quality advantage. This discrimi-
natory policy improves the buyer’s welfare over what
she receives in the sealed BDA at the expense of social
efficiency and seller profit. However, in our experi-
ments, we find that the dynamic PBA with credits out-
performs the sealed BDA for both buyers and sellers
because (1) the sellers do not follow the symmetric
Nash strategy in the sealed BDA, and (2) the buyers
assign overly generous bidding credits in the dynamic
PBA with credits.
The transformation of how enterprises procure
goods and services is one promise the emergence of
e-commerce has actually fulfilled. Part of this transfor-
mation is an increase in the use of buyer-determined
auction variations. In practice, these auctions for pro-
curement of differentiated goods are not equivalent to
the auctions typically studied by economists. Specifi-
cally, the buyer-determined auction mechanism does
not determine the seller; the auction only sets each par-
ticipating seller’s price. After the auction, the buyer
selects the winning seller and pays that seller his exit
price from the auction. This is how currently used
procurement auctions manage product differentiation
(Kinney 2000).
The dynamic PBAwith credits is a potentially attrac-
tive alternative to current procurement auction prac-
tices. In the current business use of English auctions,
a seller no longer has a transparent dominant strategy
and, more importantly, a buyer cannot credibly com-
mit to a discriminatory policy when they select a seller
after the auction. Evaluating the nonprice attributes
of goods after the auction, the buyer is less likely to
use a discriminatory policy. This would require some-
times selecting a seller who does not provide the best
combination of price and quality. With the dynamic
PBA with credits, the evaluation of quality prior to the
auction is an opportunity to precommit to a discrim-
inatory policy that doesn’t suffer from the credibility
problem of exercising the policy after the auction.
Another promising application of the dynamic PBA
with credits and its strategic transparency to the seller
is its use in managing the longer-term procurer–seller
relationship. As noted by Jap (2007), current applica-
tions of the reverse auction alienate this relationship
and can lead to worse procurement performance. This
study demonstrates that smart use of the dynamic PBA
with credits can lead to making both the sellers and
buyer better off. This comes from the fact that in the
various forms of procurement auctions without trans-
parent dominant strategies, bidders fail to adopt Nash
equilibrium bidding strategies and lead to inefficient
market outcomes. The dynamic PBA with credits may
allow one to realize additional gains from exchange
that would otherwise be lost when using other forms
of procurement auctions.
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